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“Militant Islam derives from Islam but it is a misanthropic, misogynist,
triumphalist, millenarian, anti-modern, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, terroristic,
jihadistic, and suicidal version of it.  Fortunately, it appeals to only about 10
percent to 15 percent of Muslims, meaning that a substantial majority would
prefer a more moderate version.  Nevertheless, this “totalitarian ideology” even
with “only” 10 to 15 percent (roughly 100 to 150 million persons world wide)
“regards itself as the only rival, and the inevitable successor, to Western
civilization”.  …It’s a mistake to blame Islam, a religion 14 centuries old, for the
evil that should be ascribed to militant Islam—a totalitarian ideology less than a
century old.  Militant Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution.”  
—Daniel Pipes, interview with Janet Tassel, “Militant about ‘Islamism’: Daniel
Pipes Wages ‘Hand-to-hand Combat’ with a ‘Totalitarian Ideology,’” 
Harvard Magazine, January–February 2005.
Introduction
In this age of religious resurgence and fundamentalism of many types, it is important to
be clear about the “adjective” that is often used to label a religious movement.  In the case
of Islam, one often hears terms or labels such as “Militant Islam,” “Islamic
Fundamentalism” or “Fundamentalist Islam,” “Political Islam,” “Moderate Islam,” “Islam
Hadhari” etc.  Therefore let me begin with clarifying the usage of the two terms that are
employed in this essay.  
“Political Islam” here refers to the doctrine or movement which contends that Islam
possesses a theory of politics and the state: a theory that, forever valid, gives rise to an
obligatory model that remains ever ready for direct, literal implementation.  Political
Islam is a modern phenomenon consisting of a variety of Islamist movements whose main
objective is to mobilize Muslims for the purpose of attaining or retaining political power.
They started to emerge after First World War.  Political Islam represents only one of
several intellectual and political manifestations of the interplay between religion and
politics in the Muslim world.1) Most of these groups or movements championing “political
Islam” are driven by the imperative of reviving the public role and political status of
Islam.  “Political Islam” is a multi-faceted phenomenon and its institutional and public
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expression spans an array of movements—from those that engage in political violence to
those with politicized dakwah (missionary) and social reform agendas.  Some of the
proponents of political Islam have been referred to in various academic discussions and
the relevant literature as “political Islamists” or just “Islamists,” and “neo-fundamentalists.”
“Fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist” are also labels which have gained currency in
the recent academic literature that examines the deep nexus and, expressing it, the
various ensuing localized, on-the-ground relationships between certain Islamist or Islamic
revivalist movements and challenges of modernity.  
The term fundamentalism came into common usage in the second decade of the
twentieth Century, with the publication of a series of pamphlets called “The
Fundamentals” which appeared between 1910–1915 in the USA and through a series of
subsequent conferences of the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association of 1919.
These fundamentalist doctrines were put forward by hard-line Protestant theologians in
America who were determined to halt what they regarded as the drift towards liberalism
in religious belief in their society.  Fundamentalist attitudes can be found throughout
human history, but especially in the modern period, with most religions exhibiting them
at some point or other in their development, and increasingly so as they gain power.2)
George Marsden defined fundamentalism in its heyday as “militantly anti-modernist
Protestant evangelicalism.” 3) There are also parallels in all religious traditions, from
local reformers whose influences are limited, to those who gave rise to new religious
institutions and traditions.
Political Islam, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ and Muslim Fundamentalists
Fundamentalists are not necessarily in opposition to modernism as a whole, especially
its technical and pragmatic aspects, although in different ways most of them resist change
or what we might call modernity.  Indeed, Muslim fundamentalists, for example, have
proved themselves masters of some of the technology and the organizational
sophistication that we often identify with modernity.  They have also shown great interest
in science and its relations to religion that often exceeds that of religious liberals.  
Muslim fundamentalists do not reject the technological trappings of modern life—
indeed sometimes they eagerly embrace it—but they do define themselves in opposition
to certain aspects of modern culture, especially scientific naturalism, modern and critical
interpretations of the sacred or religious texts, and perceived changes in moral values.  In
their oppositional posture Muslim fundamentalists detach themselves from certain trends
in modern culture, and they also commit themselves to battle against those trends.  They
also make claims to carry on a “traditional and/or authentic” life of piety as, putatively, it
was lived in the formative age of Islam, and they accordingly understand themselves to be
going back to the fundamental teachings of formative Islam.  Islamic fundamentalism is a
creature of modernity as well as a reaction to it.  Most Islamic fundamentalist movements
seek to revive or establish “true” Islam in society through some kind of political means.
This is often expressed in claims of the “obligatoriness” of establishing what its ideological
advocates understand as an “Islamic state.”  
In this context, Ayubi argues that political Islam is a new invention, one that:
does not represent a “going back” to any situation that existed in the past or to any
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theory that was formulated in the past.  What it keeps from the past is the juridic tradition
of linking politics and religion.  But even then, it seeks to transform the formalistic and
symbolic link that the jurists had forged between politics and religion into a real bond.
Furthermore, political Islamists want to reverse the traditional relationship between the
two spheres so that politics becomes subservient to religion, and not the other way
round, as was the case historically.4)
Militant Islamism is just one form of political Islam, one that adopts violent methods to
achieve its political objectives.  Most examples of this tendency are provided by smaller
organizations, sometimes splinter groups from a larger Islamic fundamentalist movement.
One example is the Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra a militant Islamist organization involved in the
killing of the Egyptian Minister for Religious Affairs in 1977 and later also of President
Anwar Sadat (and which, in time, would count among its offspring, through Osama bin
Laden’s close associate Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the universally feared al-Qaeda faction or
movement).  The Front Pembela Islam group that was involved in attacking some churches
and setting fire to night-clubs in Indonesia is another.  Other examples of radical Islamist
militant groups are the Hizbollah and Hamas in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in
Palestine, the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) in
Malaysia.
The focus in this essay will be upon only those political and fundamentalist Islamist
movements that do not have recourse primarily to violent means to promote their
version of Islam or to install their model of an “Islamic state” or Islamic government.
Political Islamist groups or movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun) in Egypt and the Islamist political party PAS (Parti Islam Se Malaysia) in
Malaysia are two examples of such political Islamist movements.  They subscribe to
what may be termed “core” or “generic” fundamentalist doctrines of the kind outlined
above, yet they participate in the democratic political processes such as nominating
candidates to contest periodic general elections, whether they be of a substantive or
merely a “window-dressing” character, to elect parliamentary governments.  This present
discussion focuses on the variety, and strategic form, of political Islam in Malaysia where
the fusion of secular and Muslim politics has become a prominent feature of national
political life since the early 1980s.  
Political Islam in Malaysia
Over the past three decades Islam has emerged as a potent political force in many
Muslim societies, one offering an avenue for protest politics and an alternative to the
secular political orders that often were heritage of the postcolonial state’s formative
colonial past.  Malaysia’s political Islamist movements are no exception, differing little in
their ideological constructs and their social and political aspirations from most other
such Islamic movements throughout the Arab and Middle-Eastern region.  In Malaysia
Islam occupies a special position, politically and constitutionally, despite the fact that it is
a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country.  The Malaysian Federal Constitution enshrines
Islam as a central feature of Malay identity; this key feature of Malaysian life emerged as
a result of negotiation, at times even contestation, from the indigenous Malay community
and its political leaders in the years immediately preceding the achievement of political
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independence (merdeka) from British colonial rule.
The rise of political Islam in the Muslim world has certain and specific consequences
for Muslim female members of those societies.  Over the past two decades the experience
of Muslim women has shown that all forms of political Islam seek to organize the
practices of all aspects of social life.  They often pay overwhelming attention to the
family as a social unit, and to issues such as veiling, segregation of the sexes, and the
imposition of extreme penalties for moral crimes such as adultery and drunkenness.
Muslim fundamentalist movements often insist that many social and political changes
must be made so that a “true” or “pristine” Islam can be restored.  Where the assertion of
male Muslim ascendancy and autonomy in other directions—in the public life of the
state, and internationally beyond its borders—is often limited, even thwarted, large
numbers of excluded and marginalized Muslim men turn instead to the assertion of
their leadership within personal relations in the domestic or family realm; and to the
affirmation of what they understand as proper Islamic moral values by the forceful
imposition, in Islam’s name, of what they see as still valid but long scorned moral truths
upon the bodies, minds and lives of their dependent womenfolk.  
In the case of Malaysia, the politicization of Islam was a consequence of the spread of
fundamentalist Islamic movements within the Islamic opposition party, among students
and in the activities of social movements for Islamic religious intensification and renewed
orthodoxy (dakwah).  It was also a product of the “Islamization policies” implemented by
the UMNO-led Malaysian federal government led by the UMNO party, in large
measusure driven by the UMNO’s ever escalating competition against the Islamist party
PAS for support and votes from within the nation’s majority Malay community.  This
“Islamization agenda” was implemented along with an array of economic development
policies under the administration of Dr. Mahathir Mohammad during the slightly more
than two decades of his premiership (1981–2003).  The Barisan Nasional government’s (or
specifically its dominant component, the UMNO’s) need to legitimize itself among the
nation’s majority Muslim constituents against the Islamist challenge mounted by the
main opposition political party, PAS, shaped the formulation and drove the
implementation of the federal government’s multi-pronged “Islamization” policies.  As
noted below, a number of these policies and many of these newly-created “Islamic laws”
resulted in a notable curtailing of the human and citizenship rights of many Malaysians,
but especially of contemporary Muslim women.  
As the contestation for power between UMNO and PAS escalates, issues such as the
Islamic state, the enforcement of the punitive hudud law punishments, discrimination
against women, and growing constraints upon freedom of expression and freedom of
religion (including freedom within religion and freedom from religion and the arbitrary
assertion of religious authority) began to enter the public sphere and into the
consciousness of many Malaysian “civil society organizations.”  This engagement with the
new assertiveness, especially in the legislative and juridical areas, of “political Islam”
became more pronounced and urgent as they grappled, often while many in the UMNO
remained nonplussed and politically paralysed, with impact of the radical and far-
reaching Islamization initiatives of the Islamist PAS governments in the two economically
underdeveloped and culturally very conservative Malay-majority east coast states of
Kelantan and Trengganu.  [PAS exercised executive power, based on predominance in
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the local legislature, in Kelantan from 1959 until 1978 and again from 1990 until the
present, and in Terrenganu from 1959 to 1961 and again from 1999 to 2004; the impact
of this PAS challenge was felt not only in those two keenly contested states but throughout
the rest of peninsular Malaysia including the states under the BN governments.]
Since the 1980s, the continuing demand for an Islamic social order—vaguely upheld as
the “solution to all our problems” by many who felt excluded from the benefits of
Malaysia’s rapid economic development, or sidelined by the unevenness and perceived
inequity of the spread of its opportunities—has led to intensifying conflict at a number of
levels: at the political and social levels, between various segments of the religious
authorities, and between conservative and progressive women’s groups.  The rivalry for
“Islamic legitimacy” between UMNO and PAS, with their competing agendas for Islamic
intensification and institutional elaboration, produced an “Islamization race” that resulted
in an acceleration of the process of the politicization of Malaysian Islam rather than any
raising or refinement of the quality of the fruits of this runaway Islamization.  The efforts
of the two parties to “outdo one another as Muslims to do good” produced, not as the
Qur’an envisages, any improvement in the quality of outcomes but only a heightening of
the speed, and at times even recklessness, of mindless (or insufficiently mindful)
intensification and politicization of the religion’s most regressive features.  Its bid under
the leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohammad to “out-do” PAS served only to compromise
the secular and pluralistic foundations of the 1957 Federal Constitution.
On gender relations and women’s rights both PAS and UMNO have adopted the
narrow perspectives of global Muslim fundamentalist movements.  UMNO-led
government in all but two states of the Federation in peninsular Malaysia have gradually
initiated changes and amendments in the Muslim Family Laws and in the Syariah Criminal
Offences Acts or comparable legislation.  Undertaken since 1984, these amendments have
often been consistent with the neo-traditionalist views held by the Islamist ideologues of
the rights and duties of Muslim women in matters of marriage and divorce.  While
UMNO contends that PAS is committed to establishing an Islamic state in Malaysia
based on the thinking of proponents of a “conservative and extremist” Islam, the policies
and actual initiatives of the UMNO itself have not differed greatly from those favoured
and advanced by PAS in these same areas.  In various state jurisdictions the UMNO has
promoted “Islamization” policies which have had the net effect of curtailing human and
citizenship rights of many contemporary Muslims, especially women.  In its enthusiasm to
uphold Islam, or to prevent PAS from presenting itself as the sole party keen to do so, the
UMNO and UMNO-led state governments have pioneered the drafting and enforcement
“Islamic laws” which have undermined gender equality among Malaysian Muslims.
The Islamization policies promoted by UMNO have not produced an enlightened or
progressive Islam, mainly because the personnel appointed by the UMNO to staff the
expanding Islamic affairs and religious administration departments and research
institutions have not differed, in their basic outlook and “mindset,” from the PAS ulama
(religious leaders and experts) whom they were supposed intellectually to counter and
corner, embarrass and expose.  The UMNO appointees to these new offices simply
could not do the job asked of them, nor was it ever likely that they might: because they
did not differ in their basic approach from that of the Islamists, but remained intellectually
fearful of and subservient to them; and because they never began to understand what it
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was they needed to know, and have command of, as Muslims in order to provide any
plausible, effective alternative to the ideological hegemony of the entrenched conservative
and neo-traditional Islamist scholars.  Products of a similar, often even identical, training
and education, ulama from opposite sides of the party-political divide are very similar in
attitude, worldview, and their approach to a wide range of contemporary social issues and
political questions.  They differ little in their social formation, religious socialization,
and Islamic sensibilities, and they draw upon the same sources of neo-traditionalist
Islamic thinking.
In the context of law-making, ulama of both stripes draw upon, and wish now
unmodified to apply to current social realities, the same historical fiqh [law and
jurisprudential reasoning] as did their scholastic predecessors of centuries ago, without
recognizing the need to engage critically with the implications of the very different
historical and cultural context from which the classical fiqh emerged, in which it took
shape, and which it reflects and ultimately ossifies.  It is this version of Islam, that of the
technical practitioners of and archaizing legalistic establishment, that continues to be
hold political sway today, over the Muslim populace generally and, especially, over the
minds and imagination of fearful, conventionally-minded politicians.  Under their
narrowing and inhibiting influence, the critical role of modern interpretation consistent
with the vast changes within of Muslim society over the last century and more has been
overlooked.
In the area of the derivatively British “common law” jurisdiction, Malaysian politicians
have never dared to create a forward-looking Law Reform Commission of the kind that is,
and has long been, commonplace in most modern nations living under legal systems of
the same historical origins.  In exactly the same way, the cause of Islam, and the creation
of forms of modernity grounded in the Islamic civilizational tradition, have been blighted
and arrested by the failure of Malaysia’s national political leadership within the UMNO to
create—with a far-reaching scholarly mandate, and substantial institutional and social
autonomy—and thereafter support a Sharia’h Law Reform Commission.  Without such a
Commission, there is no prospect that the direction of Malaysia’s ever intensifying
Islamization initiatives will, especially in the legal area, display anything other than an
ever more regressive character, and become ever more restrictive in their effects.
Meanwhile, in the absence of any such Islamic Law Reform Commission and any
high-level official commitment to its purposes and project, Malaysian government
initiatives will continue to be fertile in producing contradictions and inconsistencies
between the claims of the governing party to create a modern, benign and moderate
Islam and its actual practice.  There is a need for Malaysian Muslims, from the central
councils of government and the UMNO party downwards and outwards, to consolidate a
conception of Islam that is compatible with modernity and encourages pluralism and
democracy.
The implication here is clear: the nation’s Malay Muslim leaders within the UMNO
must be open to, and must embrace with commitment, those contemporary
interpretations and understandings of the teachings of Islam that allow for change in the
face of evolving time, the contraction of space, and the widening reach of human
experience, or, in short, the Muslim experience of globalization.  The old Muslim
aspiration to moral universalism and historical inclusiveness must be enlarged and
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urgently updated, commensurate with the broad impact upon the worldwide ummah
(community of Muslims) of globalizing processes.  Recognition of, and a readiness to have
intelligent recourse to, the historicity of texts and doctrines are crucial for the success
among Malaysian Muslims of this project.  
Political Islam and Gender Rights: Problems and Challenges
A concrete example of these dilemmas is to be found in the area of gender relations
and their regulation.  The derogation of Muslim women’s rights in contemporary societies
is, in significant part, a consequence of implementing neo-traditionalist readings of the
classical fiqh (Islamic legal scholarship and juristic thought).  Grounded in the patriarchal
ideology of pre-Islamic Arabia, the fiqh model of gender relations was carried forward, if
in a modified form, into the Islamic era and thereafter, within legalistic scholarship and its
increasingly frozen or ossified forms, into the modern and contemporary eras.  There is
extensive debate on this question of the pre-Islamic origins of these deep templates of
gender relations in the literature.5) Suffice to say here that neo-traditionalist and
fundamentalist Muslims interpretations reject gender equality and instead put forward the
complementarity of gender rights and duties.  Hence, they hold the view that women as
wives must seek permission from their husbands if they want to leave the home for any
purpose, and especially if they intend to seek work or employment outside the home.
Because men are entrusted with major responsibilities as heads of household and
breadwinners, they are regarded as superior in degree to women, whose central duty is to
be obedient and pious wives.  Muslim women must also accept that it is the right of
Muslim males to enter into polygynous marriages (regardless of the first wife’s feelings and
in defiance of her preferences, without her consent); and, in consequence under this
same dispensation, husbands are allowed to beat their recalcitrant or “disobedient” wives
so long as such treatment does not incur any physical injury.  [The questions of how this
threshold is to be located and measured, what is to be done to prevent its transgression,
and the question of emotional as distinct from physical injury and abuse are left largely
unaddressed in the relevant sources and ensuing discussions.]  
In fact in Islamic culture, family life seems to be viewed very much from a strictly
patriarchal point of view—family life is sacrosanct and raised above everything else.  The
origins of much to do with sex, women and the family in the Islamic culture will probably
have to be traced back to the nomadic realities of Arabia before and around the time of
the emergence of Islam.  It must also be noted that, unlike some other cultures, the
Arab-Islamic culture regards sex as one of the desirable and legitimate pleasures of life
(and even of the afterlife as well); but it emplaces such activities and pleasures in a
markedly patriarchal rather than an egalitarian social and moral context.  
There is no sense of guilt surrounding sex in Islam, nor a call to torture the body or to
scorn or suppress its desires (as in say Christianity)—only a need to ensure its “hygiene”
(hence the elaborate rituals for washing and cleanliness) and to regulate its requirements
into certain standards that may integrate it wholesomely into the community.  In Islamic
culture too women are believed to be sexually active, even aggressive—so giving rise to
the Islamic concept or version of the femme fatale, whose evident sexuality provokes
men, makes them lose their self-control, and so succumb to temptation and ever-ramifying
disorder ( fitna).6)
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Sex, evidently, is considered so powerful an urge for both men and women that,
when alone together, a man cannot and a woman will not resist the temptation of shaitan
(the “devil”), who will always be the third party present at such moments of ostensibly
dyadic isolation.  Furthermore, in this derivatively Arab-Islamic culture, these temptations
and the promptings upon them of the shaitan being so strong, internal moral restraints and
controls must be weak and incapable of being trusted.  So emphasis and reliance are
placed on “external” rather than on “internal” moral constraints and enforcement—on
imposed precautionary safeguards, rather than on autonomous “internal prohibitions” or
moral scruples that the conscientious individual may feel and be relied upon to heed.
Hence the ensuing result: rather than expecting the man to be socialized into and trained
in self-control, the preferred solution is instead to hide the woman’s body as a source of
physicality and temptation, and to seclude her as much as possible from men, except
within the marriage relationship.
Possessed by, often perhaps even obsessed with, this underlying view, contemporary
Muslim fundamentalist, neo-traditionalist, and political Islamists make further claims for
the control and regulation of women, women’s bodies and their presence in public
space.  For them, the veiling of women and strict gender segregation are mandatory
rulings.  Under the administration of the PAS party government in Kelantan, for example,
men and women have been required under legislation introduced incrementally during
the 1990s to use separate check-out lines at supermarkets and to occupy different
segregated areas in public spaces such as meeting halls, cinemas and sports stadiums,
while all women in public places such as markets must cover their hair and faces suitably.
These rulings and other differences in rights and duties between men and women do not,
these ideologues assert, mean inequality or injustice.  In fact, the Islamists argue, if
correctly understood, these differences are the very essence of justice—their idea of
justice, which they claim is also that of Allah and Islam.  This is so because shari’ah rulings
reflect and are congruent with the Divine blueprint for society, and hence are also in line
with human nature—weak, incapable of self-control, susceptible to temptation in the case
of men, and a potent, irresistible source of temptation in that of women.  
Conclusion
In a rapidly modernizing and changing Muslim country such as Malaysia, the question
of gender, religion and society is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon.  Under these
conditions, gender discrimination arises from an ahistorical reading or interpretation of
religious texts subscribed by political and fundamentalist Islamic movements.  In the
political arena, competing parties seeking to legitimize themselves often lay claim to an
“authentic” Islamic identity by promoting, according to their own chosen views and
preconceptions, an agenda for the “Islamization of state and society.”  Unfortunately, the
dominant intellectual and interpretive resources that they draw upon in these endeavours
are those of a decidedly neo-traditionalist variety.  Political elites within what was
originally a “secular,” or at least a not an avowedly Islamist, party felt the need to prove
their village level Islamic credibility and hence the strength of their “Islamic identity” as
they were compelled to respond to the domestic resurgence of political Islam embodied
in the challenge of the Islamist party PAS.  Their response to PAS and its agenda of
thoroughgoing neo-traditionalist Islamization was to implement a counter-Islamization
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agenda of their own: an ensemble of Islamization policies—originally intended to be
markedly different from those of PAS but which in time came to constitute just a pale
imitation of the same regressive blueprint and recipe.  Intellectually outgunned and
confused, the UMNO’s ulama offered compromises and half-measures that were deemed
appropriate and unproblematic but which in essence only echoed and capitulated to
the presuppositions of PAS’s more rigorous agenda of neo-traditional institutionalization.  
The struggle for Muslim women’s rights, equal treatment and the eradication of
discrimination against women (particularly under Muslim family law) has to be fought on
two main broad fronts: (i) a struggle against the biases or discrimination emanating from
a “universal” legacy of patriarchy entrenched in society generally, and (ii) challenging
forms of discrimination that have emerged from recent adoption of or amendments to
certain Islamic rulings and laws which are often discriminatory, even misogynist, in
nature.  
While academics debate issues of analytical precision in using the term
“fundamentalism,” women’s groups and movements in many countries (both in the West
and East) need and have already begun to address substantive issues related to the rise of
contemporary religious fundamentalism and the problems and threats thereby posed to
women.  Prominent among these issues are the question of women’s human and
citizenship rights and an analysis of why, in its various cross-cultural manifestations, the
fundamentalist project is always targeted towards undermining the diverse efforts of
women’s movements for rights, social equality and justice.  
By 1995, when the Women’s World Conference was convened in Beijing, a number of
women’s groups and organizations had already been formed in various parts of the
Muslim world in response, at least in part, to the emergence and rise of religious
fundamentalist forces in their respective countries or societies.  Some examples of such
organizations are the Collectif 95 Maghreb Égalité (established in early 1995) in Tunisia,
Morocco and Algeria; the Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre in Pakistan; and later the
BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights in Nigeria (established after Beijing in 1996).
These women’s groups now confront many types of “Islamist fundamentalism.”  But
often these fundamentalist forces are international in ambition, scope and reach; inter-
linked with one another in various multifaceted ways, they frequently operate in mutually
reinforcing, transnational movements, sometimes even across cultural or religious lines of
separation.  For example, at the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population &
Development (ICPD) an alliance was formed among conservative forces identified with
various religions (e.g., the “Cairo Consensus” between Egyptian Muslim groups—Al
Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood—with the Vatican and an array of other anti-abortion
forces aligned against progressive coalitions of human rights and reproductive rights
activists).
In November 2002, an international organization called Women Living Under Muslim
Laws or WLUML convened a major international meeting in London on the subject of
“Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms.”  The main objectives of this conference were (a) to
identify the generic features of fundamentalisms (especially religious fundamentalisms),
and (b) to strengthen analysis of and thereby informed resistance to these fundamentalist
trends by pooling information about fundamentalist movements.  The ultimate objective
was to create strategies for women’s groups across countries in an effective effort to
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counteract and challenge such fundamentalist forces both within and outside their own
home countries.  
These efforts have been encouraging, even rewarding.  But at this early stage they leave
unanswered the most important question that still confronts contemporary Muslim
women: can reformist and/or progressive Muslim women’s groups and movements
become an effective countervailing force to Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam?  
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